Friday, May 22, 2009
BATTLE-TECH NOTES
A couple of items from the sources on military technology I frequent. First, the Air Force tells Congress what it would like to spend money on -- if there were any money to spend: Fielding significant numbers of F-35s as soon as possible, upgrading the existing force, and the "next generation bomber" (the so-called "NGB").
Now that we know that we're going to lose guaranteed air superiority some time in the mid-to-late-2010s because of the decision to end F-22 production at a grossly inadequate number, the only solution to be sure that we can function in the air battle space in that time and beyond is to flood the sky with other planes and take our lumps. The F-35 is slower, less maneuverable and carries a smaller war load than the F-16. Counting on its stealth to make up for that is foolish. Stealth was a magic bullet in the 1980s through the current time, but its value will erode as sensor technology catches up. In a more evenly-matched threat environment, there's going to be no substitute for sheer numbers. Want to stimulate the economy? Pour on the Lightning IIs.
The need to keep the Eagles and Falcons we have flying for another 20 years or so is also right. Again, it's simply a numbers game. I'm reminded of the role the Me-109 played for the Luftwaffe in World War II. By the beginning of what we think of as the war (as opposed to the Spanish or the Chinese, for whom the war began a lot earlier), the 109 was "obsolete" in the sense that the Allies were beginning to field superior planes. But the 109 made up for this through sheer numerical superiority and operational reliability. The F-15 (especially the Strike Eagle) and the F-16 will have to play a similar role in American air power over the next one to two decades. For that, money will have to be spent.
As for the strike capability envisioned with the NGB, I'm not so sure. It's hard to tell much about this program, because there are signs that some of it is developing in the black budget. But a new manned pure "strategic" bomber, with all its attendant expense, seems like a long shot in an environment in which we can't have assured air superiority. By the time such a conception of the NGB could actually come on line (the late 2010s at the earliest), I think a cheaper, unmanned solution to delivering ordinance might make much more sense.
And then, over here, we see continuing talk about the pressing need to develop practical tactical-level directed energy weapons. The sources cited in this article make the point that the need is obvious and the experience we've had with playing "catch-up" with these kinds of systems ought to be a lesson. But it won't be ...
GB, THHotA
posted by Greg 7:40 AM
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